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Abstract—As the development of a viable quantum computer
nears, existing widely used public-key cryptosystems, such as
RSA, will no longer be secure. Thus, significant effort is being
invested into post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Lattice-based
cryptography (LBC) is one such promising area of PQC, which
offers versatile, efficient, and high performance security services.
However, the vulnerabilities of these implementations against
side-channel attacks (SCA) remain significantly understudied.
Most, if not all, lattice-based cryptosystems require noise samples
generated from a discrete Gaussian distribution, and a successful
timing analysis attack can render the whole cryptosystem broken,
making the discrete Gaussian sampler the most vulnerable
module to SCA. This research proposes countermeasures against
timing information leakage with FPGA-based designs of the
CDT-based discrete Gaussian samplers with constant response
time, targeting encryption and signature scheme parameters. The
proposed designs are compared against the state-of-the-art and
are shown to significantly outperform existing implementations.
For encryption, the proposed sampler is 9x faster in comparison
to the only other existing time-independent CDT sampler design.
For signatures, the first time-independent CDT sampler in
hardware is proposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is one of the most important tools to pro-
tect information sent across public networks, using digital
signatures and encryption. This security, currently supported
by the hardness of factoring large primes (RSA) and the
discrete logarithm problem (elliptic-curve cryptography), may
soon be under threat by the possible construction of quantum
computers. Indeed, the NSA and CESG have both indicated
a need to transition towards quantum-resistant algorithms [1],
[2]. Protecting secure communications against quantum attacks
is vital, and thus several post-quantum (or quantum-resilient)
constructions have been proposed to protect technologies
such as cloud security and the Internet of things. Lattice-
based cryptography (LBC) is arguably the most promising
when compared to other post-quantum cryptosystems, as it
offers extended functionality and average-case to worst-case
hardness, whilst being more efficient for both encryption and
digital signature schemes [3].
However, the real-world practicality of LBC should be
considered, including suitable countermeasures against side-
channel analysis (SCA). A NIST call [4] requests new
quantum-resilient algorithms that offer SCA attack resistance.
The most vulnerable component of lattice-based cryptosystems
is the generation of randomness, typically discrete Gaussian
randomness, to mask the computations of the secret-key and
plaintext data. Unfortunately, discrete Gaussian samplers are
highly susceptible to timing-analysis attacks, due to non-
constant run-time [5]. There has been little research into the
SCA-resilience of lattice-based cryptographic implementations
to physical attacks; only Roy et al. have investigated masking
[6] and side-channel secure discrete Gaussian sampling [7].
This research proposes a timing-attack resilient hardware
design of a discrete Gaussian sampler, adopting the cumula-
tive distribution table (CDT) [8] technique. Practical FPGA
designs of novel CDT-based constant response time samplers,
with appropriate practical parameters for both encryption and
signatures, are presented.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Lattice-based Cryptography
One foundational work that underpins LBC is the learning
with errors (LWE) problem [9]. Cryptosystems based upon the
LWE problem enjoy worst-case to average-case hardness; they
are proven infeasible to break unless all instances of certain
lattice problems are easy to solve [10], [11]. Lattice-based
cryptosystems, based on the hardness of the LWE problem
are as hard to solve as Definition 1.
Definition 1: [LWE] For positive integers n and q ≥ 2, the
secret s ∈ Znq , and a probability distribution χ on Zq , let As,χ
be the LWE distribution, obtained by choosing a $← Znq , a
noise term e← χ, and outputting (a, b = 〈a, s〉+e) ∈ Znq×Zq .
The decisional LWE problem is defined as, given access to
m independent samples chosen according to As,χ, distinguish
between these m LWE samples and ones chosen uniformly at
random with noticeable probability.
B. Discrete Gaussian Sampling
The error distribution χ seen in Definition 1 is almost
always defined as the discrete Gaussian distribution†. The
centered discrete Gaussian distribution DZ,σ , over Z, with
standard deviation σ, is defined proportionally such that a
value x ∈ Z is sampled from Dσ with the probability
ρσ(x)/ρσ(Z), where:
ρσ(x) = exp (
−x2
2σ2
) and ρσ(Z) =
∞∑
k=−∞
ρσ(k).
†With the exception of key-exchange protocols such as [12], which are
able to employ the slightly less “normal”, binomial distribution.
2Considering Sσ = ρσ(Z) =
∑∞
k=−∞ ρσ(k) ≈
√
2piσ, the
probability of sampling x ∈ Z from the distribution DZ,σ is
calculated as ρσ(x)/Sσ .
1) Exploiting Symmetry: To half the initial memory require-
ment, one can consider the distribution over Z+, proportional
to ρσ(x) for ∀x > 0. For x = 0, ρσ(0) is halved, otherwise
this will be counted twice. The distribution can be recovered
by adding a random sign bit after sampling.
2) Practical Discrete Gaussian Parameters: The statistical
distance between the “perfect” theoretical discrete Gaussian
distribution and the “practical” should be no greater than 2−λ.
It is recommended [13] that precision need be no greater than
λ/2, for a target security level λ-bits, as it is argued that no
algorithm can distinguish between a “perfect” sampler and one
with statistical distance 2−λ/2. Two important cryptographic
applications for the samplers are targeted: encryption and digi-
tal signature schemes. The parameters are from the encryption
scheme by Lindner and Peikert [14] (LP)‡, where (σ, λ, τ) =
(3.33, 64, 9.42), and the digital signature scheme by Ducas et
al. [15] (BLISS), where (σ, λ, τ) = (215, 64, 9.42).
3) Gaussian Convolution: The standard deviation can be
significantly decreased by using Peikert’s convolution lemma
[18], adapted by Po¨ppelmann et al. [19]. Referring to [8], [19]
for the formal definitions of the smoothing parameter η and
Kullback-Leibler divergence respectively, the adaption states:
Lemma 1: Let x1 ← DZ,σ1 , x2 ← DkZ,σ2 for some positive
real σ1, σ2 and let σ−23 = σ
−2
1 + σ
−2
2 and σ
2 = σ21 + σ
2
2 . For
any  ∈ (0, 12 ) if σ1 ≥ η(Z)/
√
2pi and σ3 ≥ η(kZ)/
√
2pi,
then (“perfect”) distribution P of x1 + x2 verifies
DKL(P||DZ,σ) ≤ 2
(
1−
(1 + 
1− 
)2)2
≈ 322.
Proof: The proof of this lemma is referred to in [19].
Lemma 1 holds for σBLISS = 215 by setting k = 11,
such that σ′ = σ/
√
1 + k2 ≈ 19.47, and by sampling
twice x′1, x
′
2 ← DZ,σ′ a value x ← DZ,σ can be built as
x = x′1 + kx
′
1. Although an additional sample is required, a
smaller standard deviation means that memory consumption
of the precomputed tables is significantly reduced; memory
consumption is reduced from 130kb for σBLISS = 215, to
11.74kb for σ′BLISS = 19.47.
III. THE CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION TABLE SAMPLER
The cumulative distribution table (CDT) sampler requires a
precomputed table of discrete Gaussian cumulative distribution
function (CDF) values [8]. CDT sampling is arguably more
promising than other discrete Gaussian sampling schemes, as
the distribution parameters are known in advance. The CDF
values range from 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and are stored in a look-up
table S[x], where the total number of table entries is at least:
N = τ × σ, where 0 = S[0] < S[1] < . . . < S[N − 1] = 1.
CDT sampling works as follows: sample r $← {−τσ, . . . , τσ},
with λ bits of precision. r is compared against the CDF table
contents to find an interval such that: S[x] ≤ r < S[x + 1],
‡The same parameters are used for implementing the ring-LWE en-
cryption scheme of Lyubashevsky et al. [16], see [17] for a hardware
implementation.
where x is output as the required discrete Gaussian sample,
occurring with probability ρ[x] = S[x+ 1]− S[x].
For comparisons, binary search is chosen, and is detailed
in Algorithm 1. Pointers min, max, and mid point to the
first, last, and middle of the search space, respectively. r is
iteratively compared to the middle value of the search space
S[cur], whose upper or lower half is discarded depending
on the comparison result. For a finite search space with N
samples, the comparisons required before a match does not
exceed dlog2(N)e.
Algorithm 1 CDT Sampling from DZ,σ via Binary Search
Require:
1: Three integers min, mid, and max.
2: CDT values 0 = S[0] < S[1] < · · · < S[N − 3] = 1.
3: Uniformly sampled r ∈ {0, . . . , (2λ − 1)} and bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Ensure: min← 0;max← N ;mid← (min+max)/2;
4: while (max > min) do
5: if (r ≥ S[mid]) then
6: min← (mid+ 1);
7: else
8: max← mid;
9: return x = (−1)b(mid− 1)
A. Previous work
The use of CDT sampling was proposed by Peikert [8],
and adapted by Ducas et al. [15]. Po¨ppelmann et al. [19]
implemented BLISS on reconfigurable hardware and suggested
optimisations for the CDT sampler, including hashing to
reduce the search space and skipping the leading zero storage
to reduce the table size by a factor of 2. Du and Bai [20] further
optimised hardware area by using piecewise comparison and
hashing. These optimisations reduce the precomputed table
size, and improve throughput. However, hashing divides the
search intervals into irregular sizes, meaning the binary search
has non-constant execution time, making it susceptible to
timing analysis attacks.
The only CDT sampler design on a FPGA with constant-
time throughput is by Po¨ppelmann and Gu¨neysu [21]. This
fully pipelined design offers a single cycle per sample through-
put, but the large number of parallel comparisons renders it
impractical. Roy et al. [7] presented a hardware design of
a discrete Gaussian sampler resistant against timing attacks,
using a Knuth-Yao sampler that generates a batch of samples,
subsequently shuffled to disassociate the related timing infor-
mation. However, this design is non-constant time and only
suitable for small standard deviations.
B. Timing Attack Vulnerabilities
Side channel attacks are physical attacks, based on in-
formation gained from the physical implementation of a
cryptosystem. To date, little research has been conducted
on the vulnerabilities of LBC implementations to physical
attacks; efforts so far are summarised by Hodgers et al. [22].
Timing analysis attacks are highly algorithm-specific in nature,
where the dependency between the execution time of an
algorithm and its secret internal states is exploited. Attacks on
LBC constructions are emerging [23], [5]. The timing-attack
countermeasure is to guarantee an execution time independent
of the secret values [24]. This can be achieved by ensuring
3constant response time [21] or subsequent random shuffling
of the secret values [7]. The following definition of time
independence is used in this research:
Definition 2 (Time independence): A program achieves the
property of independent-time when no information about the
secret value(s) is leaked by the timing of the program.
IV. CONSTANT-TIME CDT HARDWARE ARCHITECTURES
A constant-time implementation of a CDT sampler is
achievable by comparing the table in a fixed number of clock
cycles. Algorithm 1 shows that an early termination is possible
if the comparison of uniformly sampled r and the S[mid]
returns an equality. This exact match could happen with a
small probability of 2−λN . This early termination is avoided
by not monitoring an exact match of r and S[mid] separately.
Hence, the binary search algorithm is always bounded between[blog2(N)c, dlog2(N)e] search iterations of the for loop.
Consequently, where N is a power of two, the algorithm
executes exactly in constant-time; and for all other N , the
algorithm is tweaked to occasionally perform an extra iteration
to ensure the algorithm complexity is fixed to dlog2(N)e.
A. Trivium as a PRNG
The CDT sampler requires uniformly distributed samples,
for which Trivium [25] is selected, due to its versatility. It is a
synchronous, binary stream cipher with a 288-bit internal state.
To achieve a large number of uniformly random bits per clock
cycle, the Trivium modules are unrolled. The resources for
unrolled designs compared to standard Trivium×1 are rather
negligible: 28 additional LUTs, 63 additional flip-flops, and 15
additional slices for Trivium×8 and 26 additional LUTs, 147
additional flip-flops, and 21 additional slices for Trivium×32
on a Spartan-6 LX25-3 device, post place-and-route.
B. Proposed Constant-Time CDT Sampler For Encryption
Figure 1a illustrates the proposed constant-time CDT sam-
pler for encryption. The CDF table S[·] consists of N = 32
(τ×σ) entries, with λ = 64. A single ported ROM, a 5-bit ad-
dress port and a 64-bit data port are employed. Trivium×64 is
used for uniform sample generation, with module initialisation
(key setup, IV setup, and the randomisation phase) handled
externally at startup, and thereafter controlled by the binary
search state-machine, BinSearch. The uniform samples are
only generated when required, saving circuit power.
The BinSearch state-machine begins at the SET state,
resetting the three pointers (min, mid, and max) to initial
values (as in Algorithm 1). It transitions unconditionally to the
SEARCH state in the next clock cycle and these three pointers
are updated, given the result from the 64-bit comparison. After
exactly 5 cycles, a search is found, and the state generates a
single bit hit. The Trivium module is activated by this hit
to request a new uniformly random 64-bit value. The buffered
mid is combined with a random bit b, which attaches a sign
to the generated discrete Gaussian sample x.
C. Proposed Constant-Time CDT Sampler For Signatures
The proposed CDT sampler for signatures uses two state-
machines, BinSearch0 and BinSearch1, to parallelise
two independent searches (see Figure 1b). Since most FPGA
devices have dual ported BRAMs, the CDF table for both
state-machines can be accessed from one BRAM. Each state-
machine has an 8-bit address and a 64-bit data port. The two
state machines each get a 64-bit uniformly random number, r0
and r1 respectively, from the PRNG, in two consecutive clock
cycles. During the next 8 clock cycles, r0 and S[mid0] are
compared in BinSearch0 and the three pointers are updated.
Simultaneously, r1 is processed at BinSearch1. The state-
machines work independently to generate two independent
random samples x0 and x1 in 8 clock cycles; the two samples
are then combined as x = x0 + 11x1, where lastly a sign bit
is assigned.
V. RESULTS, EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
This section presents the post place-and-route performance
results and comparison of the proposed samplers with existing
sampler implementations for encryption and signatures. Xilinx
ISE 14.7 is used, and where possible comparable implemen-
tations have been re-run on the same FPGA device in order
to fairly compare the results. Throughput and throughput
per area (TPAR) have been evaluated for all schemes, in
terms of sampling operations per second (Ops/s) and sampling
operations per second per slice (Ops/s/S). Table I gives the
CDT sampler resource consumption for both encryption and
signature parameters. A low cost Spartan-6 FPGA is targeted,
and low area and balanced results are presented, where the
area-optimised designs employ BRAM, unlike the balanced
designs, which offer higher running frequencies.
Table II shows performance results of the samplers, com-
pared with existing CDT hardware samplers. For encryption
parameters, a single ported distributed ROM comprising of
LUTs is proposed in the design without BRAM. The slice
resources can be significantly reduced if BRAMs are utilised.
However, the price of resource reduction is paid for by reduced
operable frequency. The only other constant-time CDT imple-
mentation for encryption is by Po¨ppelmann and Gu¨neysu [21],
which generates a single sample per cycle. However, it is 4x
slower in frequency with 5x many slices, and thus this research
offers a more lightweight, constant-time alternative. The CDT
sampler design by Du and Bai [20] is lightweight but it is
only for encryption and does not run in independent-time. For
signature parameters, the implementation by Po¨ppelmann et al.
[19] operates in non-constant time but has a lower throughput
per slice than this work. Thus the CDT sampler proposed in
this research is preferable for practical implementations.
Table I: Resource consumption of the CDT sampler on a
Spartan-6 LX25-3 FPGA for a) encryption parameters and b)
signature scheme parameters.
Sampler Registers LUT Slice BRAM Freq.
a) CDT Area 17 53 16 2 136
a) CDT Balance 26 66 21 0 394
b) CDT Area 48 130 44 2 126
b) CDT Balance 64 577 179 0 130
Available 30,064 24,051 3,758 52 -
4(a) CDT sampler for encryption parameters.
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Figure 1: The CDT-based discrete Gaussian samplers for encryption and digital signature scheme parameters, using one
BinSearch state machine for (a) and two BinSearch state machines for (b), each accessing the CDF table.
Table II: Post-place and route results of the proposed constant-time CDT sampler for encryption and signature parameters, in
comparison to existing CDT-based results.
Op. Implementation Device λ LUT/FF BRAM Freq. Clock Rand. Ops/s Ops/s/S Time
/Slice (MHz) Cycles Bits (MHz) (MHz/S) Ind.
Po¨ppelmann &
6VLX75T-2 80
863/6/231 0 61 1 85 6.1 0.26 X
Gu¨neysu [21] 911/6/255 0 61 1 85 6.1 0.24 X
σLP = This work 6VLX75T-2 64
112/19/43 0 297 5 64 59.4 1.38 X
3.33 53/17/15 1 193 5 64 38.6 2.57 X
Du & Bai [20] 5VLX30 112
43/33/17 1 259 ≈2.28 ≈9.44 113.6 6.68 7
85/65/39 1 256 ≈1.14 ≈9.44 224.6 5.76 7
Po¨ppelmann
6SLX25-3 128 928/1121/299 1 129 ≈7.5 ≈21 17.2 0.06 7
σBLISS = et al. [19]
215
This work 6SLX25-3 64
577/64/179 0 130 8 64 16.3 0.09 X
130/48/44 2 126 8 64 15.8 0.36 X
VI. CONCLUSION
In this research two independent-time hardware designs
of a discrete Gaussian CDT sampler are proposed, suitable
for encryption and signature applications, with a focus on
low-area foot-print and high throughput. Resistance against
timing attacks is achieved by ensuring constant execution
time. Moreover, the proposed hardware CDT sampler designs
clearly outperform the previously proposed samplers.
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